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JURISDITION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sect. 78A-4-2-
103(2)(e) and Rules 3 and 4 of Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ISSUE ONE: Did the District Court commit reversible eijror in allowing the case to go to 
the jury when the State failed to establish any misleading statements made by the defendant that 
could be made not misleading by any of the alleged omissions the State presented to the jury and 
when the State failed to present any evidence of an offer, sale or purchase of a security for value. 
This issue is discussed un Point One of the Argument. 
Standard of Review: This is an issue of law reviewed for correctness. See State v. 
MacGuire, 2004 UT 4, 84 P.3d 1171 (2004) 
Preservation of the issue: The issue was preserved in the Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss (R. ???) and was also argued at the close of the State's case , Trial Transcript ("TT") 
pp. 296-299). It was also argued in Closing Argument (TT pp. 372 - 396) and on the Motion to 
Arrest Judgment. (R ???). 
ISSUE TWO: Did the District Court commit reversible error in allowing the State's 
expert, Mr. Hines, the Director of Enforcement for the Utah Division of Securities, present to the 
jury an impermissible legal conclusion that the stock certificates given to Mr. Young and Mr. 
Myers was security? This issue is discussed under Point Two of the Argument. 
Standard of Review: "The determination as to who qualifies as an expert witness and 
the admissibility of the witness's testimony fall[s] within the discretion of the trial court," which 
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will not be reversed "[a]bsent a clear abuse of this discretion." Evan ex rel. Evans v. Langston, 
2007 UT. App. 240, 166 P.3d 621 (2007) (first alteration in original). 
Preservation of the Issue: This issue was preserved at the trial. (TT pp. 100,1149 and 
360) and the Motion to Arrest Judgment (R. ???) 
ISSUE #3: Did the District Court commit reversible error in allowing the State to 
present the jury an incorrect view of the law in violation of defendant's constitutional right to 
due process, and making the application of the statute constitutionally vague, as applied to 
defendant, and in violation of the constitutional separation of powers clause? This issue is 
discussed under Point Three of the Argument. 
Preservation of the Issue: This issue was preserved in the Motion to Dismiss (R???), TT 
pp. 296-299 and the Motion to Arrest Judgment (R. ???) 
ISSUE#4 Did the District Court commit reversible error when it allowed the 
following irrelevant, inflammatory and prejudicial evidence to go to the jury: 
A. The evidence of the $50,000 trust deed was executed August 9, 2000, at 
least 2 months after the alleged stock sale agreement, and there was no evidence that the 
trust deed was in existence, nor was it a part of, nor did the trust deed had anything to do 
with the August 9, 2000 agreement. 
B. The evidence that defendant promised to pay for 200 cows which were 
delivered after the alleged stock sale agreement, and there is no evidence that the 
defendant's alleged promise was part of, nor had anything to do with, the August 9, 2000 
agreement. 
C. The State's expert testimony of an IPO where the entire transaction did 
not involve an IPO. 
This issue is discussed under Point Four of the Argument. 
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 MR. HARMON: Your Honor, again I'd like to pose an objection (Discuss at the bench off the 
record). The State continued to question about an IPO after the objection. 
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Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion by the trial court, State v. Bisner, 2001 UT 
99, 37 P.3d 1073 (2001). 
Preservation of the Issue: preserved in the Motion for Arrest of Judgment. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, CODE SECTIONS AND RULES 
The provisions of the controlling law; constitution, statutes, and rules are attached in 
Addendum: 
Utah Constitution, Article V, Section 1 
Utah Constitution Article VI, Section 1 
Utah Code Ann. Sect. 61-1-1 
Utah Code Ann. Sect. 78A-4-2-103(2)(e) 
Rule 3, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure: 
Rule 4, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence 
Rule 704, Utah Rules of Evidence 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This case represents perhaps the best reason why the judiciary is an independent branch 
of the government, to guard and protect ordinary citizens from aggressive and overreaching 
enforcement of the laws by the executive branch ("State"). The defendant, A. Paul Schwenke, 
was charged with violating Utah Code Ann. Section 61-1-1(2) commonly referred to as "security 
fraud". This statute prohibits anyone from offering, selling or purchasing security using untrue 
statements of material facts, or making misleading statements of material fact and omitting to 
state material facts necessary to make the misleading statements, not misleading. The State 
claims that Schwenke violated this statute by selling stock of American Dairy.com to Mr. Young 
and Mr. Myer in exchange for their dairy farm in Delta, Utah. The State's expert witness 
testified to the jury that the American Dairy.com stock received by Mr. Young and Mr. Myers 
was "security" under the code, Section 61-1-1(2). 
According to the State, because Schwenke alledgedly sold security, he had a duty to 
disclose everything a "reasonable prudent investor would want to know before they make their 
decision in purchasing." TTp.90. Based on this view of the law, the State presented the jury 
with at least 20 disclosures that Schwenke failed to make to Mr. Young and Mr. Myers. That is 
the entirety of the State's security fraud claim. The State's view of the law, however, is clearly 
erroneous. The plain meaning of Section 61-1-1(2) is a prohibition against offering, selling or 
purchasing a security and telling untrue statements of material facts, or telling misleading 
statements of material facts and omitting to tell material facts that would make the misleading 
statements made, not misleading. Because of the State's erroneous view of the law, it failed to 
show any misleading statements of material fact actually made by the defendant, and instead, 
told the jury that Schwenke failed to disclose to Mr. Young and Mr. Myers at least 20 facts that a 
reasonable prudent investor would have wanted to know. The State's erroneous view of the law 
presented to the jury by its expert witness, Mr. Hines, a member of the executive branch, resulted 
in Schwenke's wrongful conviction and imprisonment. Accordingly, the honorable court is 
respectfully urged to correct the injustice inflicted on defendant and promptly reverse his 
wrongful conviction. 
Procedural History. 
The defendant and a co-defendant, Jamis Johnson, were charged by Criminal 
4 
Information on April 4, 2005. The Information was later amended on October 24, 2005 (R ???). 
The Amended Information charged Schwenke and Johnson with one count of securities fraud in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. Section 61-1-1, and one count of theft by deception in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. Section 76-6-405. Following a preliminary hearing, both Schwenke and 
Johnson were bound over for trial on both charges. (R ???). Upon motion by co-defendant 
Johnson, the cases were severed and proceeded to separately. Later, upon the State's stipulation 
the charge of theft by deception in violation of 76-6-405 was dismissed. (R ???). Schwenke then 
filed a Motion to Dismiss the charges because, among other grounds, the State has not stated any 
misleading statements of material facts actually made by the defendant and the State's view of 
the statute was erroneous. (R ???). The Motion to Dismiss was renewed at the end of the State's 
case wherein the State opposed by stating its erroneous view of the law: 
[GUNNARSON]: . . . He [Schwenke] argued that there were no predicate 
statements. I think we've had abundant testimony as to predicate statements and the 
fact of obligations of disclosures, the fact that he was a promoter and the fact (inaudible) 
even a promoter that put upon him the duty of all disclosures, which he breached. The 
fact that he didn't — he brought up subjects such as risk ~ 
[THE COURT] Well, promoter is not a defined term in the statute. 
[GUNNARSON] No, but (inaudible) definition that he's a control person, and a 
control person has that according to Mr. Hines ~ 
[THE COURT] Well, there's no — control person is not a defined thing in the 
statute, either. 
[GUNNARSON] Well, true, but then the expert testimony has been that (inaudible) 
if he is a control person and a promoter, and they have that duty to disclose. Beyond 
that, Mr. Hines has testified, and it's obvious for the jury that there is an opening of the 
door when he talked about risk. Once you talk about risk you better tell all the risks, 
and that includes conflicts, that includes background. That includes the risk of the IPO. 
As a matter of fact, the IPO was, in Hines' opinion, very probably would not have been 
granted, and that's something they should have been told. So by opening the door and 
talking about the IPO, he has to tell them the risks involved. 
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[THE COURT] Go ahead, Mr. Schwenke. 
[SCHWENKE] I think it's interesting to hear all these terms being put forth. I 
think the statute is pretty clear as to what is needed to be proven here, number one, there 
should be a sale as they allege of American Dairy stock by fne, the defendant, to Mr. 
Young and Mr. Myers. I believe the evidence does not show that I made that sale. 
More importantly, the second element, not once — 
[THE COURT] Who made the sale then if you didn't?2 
[SCHWENKE] Well, the sale was as I believe the evidence was confirmed here, 
there was idea there for a corporation to be formed for the farmers, and the farmers 
owned it and the farmers — 
{THE COURT] Well, but it was your idea, wasn't it? 
[SCHWENKE] Correct, it was my idea. But there was no sale. 
[THE COURT] This wouldn't have all took place it it hadn't been for you. 
[SCHWENKE] Well, absolutely. As a matter of fact, it shouldn't even come to 
place even right now at all, but I think what we really need to look at here is how easy 
the statute is. It's not that complicated. It does not say anything at all about a promoter. 
It doesn't say nothing about a control person. It says that I, the defendant, made a 
material misrep — 
[THE COURT] Well, first of all, you made and untrue statement, and I — I think 
they haven't pointed out any untrue statement, other than — you know, I guess — you 
know, I guess it's arguable, but — 
[SCHWENKE] Except, your honor, I believe just from the plain meaning of the 
second element that we're talking about here, they have the option to show untrue 
statements or the second option. The fact that they relied on omissions, they — means 
that they have not relied on untrue statements. They have elected to use omissions, which 
is the second option on that second element — omissions. I believe the language is clear 
enough that says, "omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make a statement 
made not misleading," That means they must put on evidence that I made misleading 
statements. 
[THE COURT] No. No. That's not what it says. 
[SCHWENKE] Well --
[THE COURT] It's that you omitted to make statements — material statements 
that in light of the — under the conditions that you made them, whatever statement they 
have, that there was low risk or that you were going to have an IPO, and — 
[SCHWENKE] What -
[THE COURT] They're alleging the fact that you omitted to give, I guess, 
background of yourself and Mr. Johnson, that that would — something that would be 
important if there was going to be a successful IPO, or if there was - if this — the 
The Court apparently already concluded , erroneously, that the issuance of American Dairy.com stock to Mr. 
Young and Mr. Meyers was a "security transaction". 
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associated risk with them making this transaction. 
[SCHWENKE] I understand what you're saying, your Honor, but if I could just 
make one more response to that. It's omit to state a material fact necessary in order to 
make the statements made. So that means there has to be a statement made. 
[THE COURT] That's true, there has to be a statement made. 
[SCHWENKE] And then the omission would make that statement not 
misleading. 
[THE COURT] Uh-huh. That's right. 
TTpp. 296-299. 
The case was presented to the jury, notwithstanding, the Court agreed that the State did 
not show any untrue statements, and agreed also that the State had to prove misleading 
statements of material fact and omissions of material facts nec^scary tc r^ake those misleading 
statements, not misleading. The jury convicted defendant on April 4, 2007 (R??7). The Court 
denied defendant's Motion to Arrest Judgment on ???? (R?9?). Defendant was sentenced on 
???? to 0 to 5 years in prison. (R ???). The Notice of Appeal was filed on ???? (R??°). On ??? 
the case was remanded to the District Court to appoint new counsel. Mr. James K. Slaven, Esq. 
was appointed counsel for Appellant on ????. (R ???). Mr. Slaven filed a motion to remand the 
case to the District Court for a hearing to establish evidence critical to the defense that were not 
produced at the trial as a result of ineffective assistance of counsel. (R ???). The court denied 
the remand motion on 77777. (R7??) Please see a copy of the order with copies of some of the 
documentary evidence that would have been produced on remand included in the Addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. Mr. Ronald Myers and Mr. James Young owned a dairy farm called Milk-King 
Farm, LLC located at Delta, Utah. TT p. 118. 
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2. Prior to the transaction, Mr. Myers and Mr. Young had a substantial loan with 
Central Bank with the dairy and land as collateral. TT pp. 116-7. 
3. In or about July, 2000, a Mr. Duane Bitton, a cattle seller and broker, introduced 
Mr. Young to Mr. A Paul Schwenke at a meeting in Fillmore, Utah. TT p. 119. 
4. Just prior to that meeting, the American Dairy.com, a Utah corporation, had been 
incorporated by Victor Lawrence. American Dairy.com had never engaged in any business 
prior to August 9, 2000 and had no bank or checking accounts. TT pp. 315-320. 
5. At the Fillmore meeting, A. Paul Schwenke outlined a proposal for several dairies 
to combine and join a new shell corporation. Each dairy that joins the corporation would be 
cleaned, painted and Internet equipment installed so the dairy and its operations could be viewed 
over the Internet. When a sufficient number of dairies join the corporation, the shell could be a 
viable entity to take to the stock market and raise funds for the participating dairies. TT pp. 
121-123. 
6. Another meeting occurred on or about August 2, 2000 at the office of Mr. Victor 
Lawrence in Salt Lake City, Utah. Mr. Young, Mr. Myers, Mr. Schwenke and Mr. Lawrence 
were present, and at some point, all went downstairs to the separate office of Jamis Johnson. TT 
p.132. 
7. At the August 2, 2000 meeting, a draft of an Agreement was reviewed. TT pp. 
134-135. 
8. The Agreement generally transferred title of the dairy and farming equipment to 
the American Dairy.com Corporation, and Mr. Young and Mr. Myers to receive 200,000 shares. 
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At the time of the Agreement Mr. Young and Myer became the only, or were the sole 
shareholders of American Dairy.com. TT pp. TT p. 153 and pp. 239-240. 
9. At the August 2, 2000 meeting, Young did not recall exactly who were present 
nor what was discussed. Myers expressed that Mr. Johnson told him that he was an attorney 
with securities expertise, that it was possible to have a public offering under Schwenke's plan 
with 15,000 cows and the stock could be offered at $4.00 to $8.00 a share. TT P. 227. 
10. Mr. Young and Mr. Myers desired to have this Agreement reviewed by their own 
attorney and took the draft Agreement to their attorney in Delta, Utah, for review and advise. TT 
pp. 143-4 and 237. 
11. Mr. Young and Mr. Meyer's attorney made revisions to the initial draft which 
were incorporated into the final draft. The main revision was that Mr. Young and Mr. Myers 
were to retain the right to buy back the dairy property and equipment for the 200,000 shares of 
stockofAmericanDairy.com. TTpp. 237-8 and 259. 
12. The parties met again on August 9, 2000. Mr. Young and Mr. Myers first met 
with A. Paul Schwenke and Victor Lawrence to review the final draft. Mr. James Young signed 
the Agreement on behalf of Milk-King Farms, LLC, then the Agreement was taken to Mr. 
Johnson's office where he signed it on behalf of American Dairy.com. TT pp. 221 and 239. 
13. After the Agreement was signed, two stock certificates were issued, one for 
50,000 shares to Mr. Young and another for 150,000 shares to Mr. Myers pursuant to the terms 
of the Agreement. TTp. 230. 
14. The testimony presented clearly demonstrated that Young and Myers were the 
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only shareholders of American Dairy.com, Inc. TT p. 181. 
15. In connection with the August 9, 2000 agreement a warranty deed was executed 
by Milk-King Farms, LLC conveying the title of the dairy farm to American Dairy.com. TT p. 
239. 
16. Mr. Young continued to operate the dairy and to control all aspects of the dairy 
operations. Mr. Young continued to maintain any bank accounts and collect all incomes. TT pp. 
182, 196-7 and 264. 
17. The State claimed that defendant failed to make the following disclosures to Mr. 
Young and Mr. Meyers in connection with the August 9, 2000 agreement: 
(1). " . . . actual risk factors involved in the venture . . ." See TT pp.91-92 
(2). ". . . minimum capitalization or the minimum amount of money you 
need to collect to make this business work. . ." See TT p.92 
(3). " . . . what happen to the money if minimum capitalization isn't 
reached." See TT p. 92. 
(4). " . . . the financial statements . . ." See TT pp. 92 and 125 
(5). " . . . history of the principals of the company. . ." See TT p.92 
(6). " . . . history of the control person . . ." See TT pp. 92-93 
(7). " . . . competition in the market. . ." See TT p. 93 
(8). " . . . the background of the CEO . . ." See TT pp. 94 and 125 
(9). " . . . that there are no Financials . . ." See TT p. 96 
(10). " . . . history of any civil litigation, criminal litigation, regulatory 
administrative actions of control person . . ." See TT pp. 96 and 151. 
(11). " . . . tax lien [of control person] . . ." See TT pp. 97, and 147, 
(12). Control persons disbarment See TT p. 101 
(13). Judgment against Jamis Johnson See TT p. 147 
(14). Federal tax lien against defendant See TT p. 148, 264 and 
Exhibit #12 
(15). Tax lien against Jamis Johnson See TT p. 150 and Exhibits 
#13,#14and#15 
(16). Jamis Johnson's bar problem See TT p.231 
(17). Defendant's disbarment See TT p.231, pp.272-274 
(18). Tax liens against Johnson and defendant See TT pp.231, 246, 264, 
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266 
(19). Notice of Default in MNSTR case Exhibit # 16 
(20). Giffen judgment against defendant See TT pp 77-78, 146-155 
18. Mr. Young testified that defendant did not make any misleading statements. See 
TT pp. 194-195. 
19. Mr. Myers testified that defendant did not make any misleading statements. See 
TT P. 266. 
20. Mr. Hine, the State's expert witness, admitted that the testimonies were that 
defendant did not make any misleading or misstatements. See TT pp. 289-290. 
21. Mr. Hine testified that the stock certificates issued to Mr. Young and Mr. Myers 
were security. See TTpp. 84-85, 286-288. 
22. Mr. Young testified and confirmed that the transaction was a change of form of 
ownership from a limited liability company to a corporation. See TT p. 145. 
23. Mr. Young and Mr. Myers confirmed that the plan was for several dairy farms to 
join, and only when enough farmers join would there be an effort to pursue an IPO. See TT pp. 
121-122, 174-176, and 257-258. 
24. Mr. Young continued to control and operate his farm and collect all income and 
pay expenses as he has always done prior to the agreement. See TT p. 182. The only change was 
the dairy was cleaned, painted and equipped with Internet server, website and cameras for it to be 
viewed live over the Internet. See TT pp. 189-190. 
25. The State claimed that defendant was the control person and promoter, and as 
such had the duty to make the disclosures listed above in paragraph 28. See TT p.90. 
11 
26. The State claimed that defendant took out a loan of $50,000.00 secured with the 
farm, and pocketed the money. See TT pp. 163, 277-278. Mr. Young stated that he had no 
knowledge if there was a $50,000.00 note, nor was there any money disbursed on the trust deed. 
SeeTTp. 187. 
27. But for ineffective assistance of counsel, bank records and testimony from PDN 
Investments would have established that only $12,500.00 was actually funded on the loan. And 
notwithstanding, Mr. Young's denial of the loan, he personally received $7,500.00 and the 
balance of $5,000.00 was paid on a $15,000 bill from cSave.net, LLC that cleaned, painted the 
dairy farm, and installed the internet server, website and cameras throughout the dairy3 as 
confirmed by Mr. Young at trial. See TT pp. 189-190. After the August 9, 2000 Agreement, 
the State claimed that defendant told Mr. Young to buy 200 cows for the farm and the 
defendant would pay for the cows. See TT p. 192. 
28. While Mr. Young claims that defendant was supposed to pay for the cows, he 
acknowledged that defendant did not promise, nor had any obligation under the August 9, 2000 
agreement to buy cows. See TT p. 192. 
29. According to the State, within 30 days after the August 9, 2000 agreement, the 
cows were delivered to the farm, and during the next 30 days the cows were repossessed. See 
TT pp. 243-244. 
Appellant was denied a remand to establish evidence of the loan including copies of the disbursement checks 
issued to Young and cSave.net. The order denying remand and copies of the checks to Mr. Young and csave.net are 
provided in Addendum. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
This brief provides legal arguments for reversal of defendant's conviction. Defendant 
demonstrated under Point One that the State failed to establish a case for security fraud under 
the plain meaning of the statute, Utah Code Ann. Section 61-1-1(2). The statute requires the 
State to prove statements of material facts that the defendant made which were misleading. Then 
the State must prove statements of material facts that the defendant did not make, but should 
have made to make the misleading statements made, not misleading. Instead of following the 
statute, the State argued that defendant was a control person and a promoter of American 
Dairy.com, and as such, the defendant had a duty to disclose all information a "reasonable 
prudent investor would want to know before they make their decision in purchasing." TT p.90. 
Based on the State's erroneous view of the statute, it presented the jury with at least 20 
disclosures that it claimed the defendant had a duty to make, but failed to do so. The State, 
however, failed to establish any misleading statements made by defendant that could be made, 
not misleading, by any of the alleged 20 omissions. Moreover, the stock transactions must be 
for value, a required element of the definition of a security under Sect. 61-1-1, but the testimony 
of the State's witness Mr. Young clearly confirmed that his receipt of American Dairy.com stock 
was not for value but instead the transaction was merely changing the form of their company, 
Milk King Dairy, LLC, a limited liability company, to the corporation American Dairy.com. No 
money changed hands, Young and Myers maintained control of their equipment and dairy, the 
bank accounts, the milk receipts, etc. 
Under Point Two, it is shown that the State's expert, Mr. Hines improperly opined that 
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the stock of American Dairy.com, the only shares of which were owned by Mr. Young and Mr. 
Myers themselves, is a security because Mr. Young and Mr. Myers testified that they expected 
the stock to increase in value, they had the right to participate in profits, and they had the right to 
vote. Mr. Hines impermissible legal conclusion is ground for the court to reverse defendant's 
conviction, and the court is respectfully urged to do so. 
Under Point Three, it is shown that the State's expert repeatedly stated the wrong 
version of the statute as requiring disclosures of all information a reasonable prudent investor 
would want to know rather than the limited disclosures required under the plain meaning of the 
statute. By prosecuting its own version of the law rather than as enacted by the Legislature, the 
State has violated defendant's constitutional right to due process. The State prosecution also 
violates the separation of power clause of the constitution. The violations resulted in 
defendant's wrongful conviction and the court is respectfully urged to correct this injustice and 
reverse and set aside the defendant's conviction. 
Under Point Four, it is shown that the conviction could have been the result of the State 
presenting irrelevant, inflammatory and highly prejudicial evidence. The defendant was charged 
with security fraud resulting from an alleged offer, sale or purchase of a security. The basis for 
the charge is an agreement executed by and between Milk King Dairy, LLC and American 
Dairy.com, on August 9, 2000. Accordingly, any alleged fraud in connection with this 
agreement must have occurred on or before August 9, 2000. The two most inflammatory and 
very prejudicial events in evidence presented to the jury, did not occur until after the agreement 
was entered into on August 9, 2000, and both were misrepresented. The first is a claim that the 
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defendant borrowed and kept for himself $50,000.00 using the dairy farm as collateral. The only 
evidence of the alleged loan was a 2nd trust deed for $50,000.00 dated October 4, 2000. There 
was no evidence of a note, nor was there any evidence that the note was funded, and if it was 
funded, who received the proceeds. More importantly, the alleged debt occurred two months 
after August 9, 2000, the date of the alleged stock sale agreement. The second is the claim that 
defendant promised to pay for 200 cows delivered to the dairy farm within 30 days after the 
August 9, 2000 agreement. There was no evidence that defendant had any legal obligation to 
pay for the cows, accordingly, even if he had promised to pay for them, it is not a crime and is a 
promise without consideration.4 More importantly, both of the claims had no bearing or any 
connection to the August 9, 2000 agreement. Additionally, the State's expert witness gave 
highly inflammatory IPO testimony that was irrelevant and very prejudicial. Indeed, most of all 
the testimony as to lack of disclosures was incorrectly presented as necessary disclosures in 
connection with an IPO. 
ARGUMENT 
Point One 
The State failed to establish a case of security fraud under the plain 
meaning of the statute, Utah Code Ann, Sect 61-1-1(2). 
The defendant was charged, convicted and imprisoned for violation of Utah Code Section 
61-1-1 (2) which provides, in relevant parts as follows: 
It is unlawful for any person, in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of any 
4
 If a remand was granted , defendant would have shown that in a restitution hearing by former co defendant 
Johnson, it was revealed that Young and Myers sold all the calves and the cows, though they did not own them, 
making in excess of $70,000.00, kept all the milk proceeds in excess of $20,000.00 and did not pay feed suppliers. 
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security, directly or indirectly to: . . . (2) make any untrue statement of a material 
fact or omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statement made, 
in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading. 
(Emphasis added). 
The correct interpretation of this statute is at issue because the entirety of the State's case, as 
shown below, is outside the purview of the statute. This court can review this statute for 
correctness as a question of law. State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 796 (Utah 1991). Ward v. 
Richfield, 798 P.2d 757, 759 (Utah 1990). It is well settled that when faced with a question of 
statutory construction, the court must first examine the plain language of the statute. Shultz v. 
BMA of N. Am. Inc., 814 P.2d 1108, 1112, (Utah 1991); Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, iOu 
(Utah 1989) (per curium). 
Under the plain language rule, section 61-1-1(2) is clear and unambiguous that the State 
must establish proof beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) the defendant engaged in an offer, sale 
or purchase of a security, and (2) made untrue statement of material fact, OR made a misleading 
statement of material fact, and omitted or failed to make a statement of material fact necessary to 
make the misleading statement made, not misleading. The entirety of the State's case was based 
on the alleged sale of American Dairy.com stock, and defendant's alleged failure to make several 
disclosures including disclosures of personal information about himself and a Mr. James 
Johnson. As shown next under Section A, all the disclosures that the State claimed the defendant 
failed to make, are not disclosures required to be made under the statute Following, under 
Section B, it is shown that the State failed to establish an offer, sale, or purchase of a security by 
the defendant foe value. 
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A. The State failed to establish any misleading statements by the defendant 
defendant that would be made not misleading by the alleged omissions. 
The State presented Exhibit #12, a Federal tax lien against defendant; Exhibits #13, #14, 
and #15, tax liens against former co-defendant Mr. Johnson; Exhibit #16 is a notice of default in 
a civil case by MNSTR against defendant and Mr. Johnson; a civil judgment by a Mr. Giffen 
allegedly against defendant and Mr. Johnson. See TT pp. 77-78 and pages 146-155. 
Additionally, the State claimed that defendant failed to provide financial statements of American 
Dairy.com which had never operated nor had any assets up to August 9,2000, it's financial 
status, its board of directors, and the risks involved. See TT p. 125. These tax liens, law suits, 
judgments, financial statements, board of directors and risks are among several disclosures that 
the government claimed were required to be made by the defendant under the above statute. 
Through Mr. Myers, the State re-emphasized defendant's alleged failure to disclose tax liens, See 
TT p. 264; and the alleged risk that the defendant was disbarred in 1989, and has a half million 
tax lien, and civil judgments. See TT pp. 272-274. Indeed, the State's case is based on 
defendant's failure to make at least 20 disclosures as set forth in paragraph 28 of the Statement 
of the Facts above. 
The State, however, failed to establish what misleading statements of material facts did 
the defendant make that would be made not misleading by any of the numerous alleged omitted 
statements. In fact, the State's witnesses, including its expert witness, all agreed that there were 
no misleading statements made by the defendant. Mr. Young admitted that defendant did not 
make any misleading statements: 
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Q [SCHWENKE] Now can you tell me [defendant] what misleading 
statement did I make that would be made not misleading by the notice of federal 
tax lien against me What statement did I make9 What misleading statement did 
I make that would be made not misleading by giving you the information about 
the federal tax hen7 
A [YOUNG] I don't remember you making a statement about that 
Q [SCHWENKE] . Exhibit #12 is a lien against - - a federal tax hen - -
tax hen against Mr Johnson Now isn't it true that I [defendant] did not make 
any misleading statement that would be made not misleading by that information 
- - by that tax hen9 
A [YOUNG] I don't remember you making any statement about your 
solvency or not, other than saying you had investors available 
Q [SCHWENKE] Okay So your testimony is you don't remember that 
defendant making any misleading statement to you9 
A: [YOUNG] that's 
Q: [SCHWENKE;; That would be make - -
A: [YOUNG] That's true 
Q- [SCHWENKE] - - not misleading All right Now Exhibit #14 is a 
similar thing, another tax lien against Mr Jamis Johnson Now again what misleading 
statement did me, the defendant, say to you that would be made not misleading by that 
tax hen against Mr Johnson9 
A: [YOUNG] Nothing, that I remember 
SeeTT pp 194-195 (Emphasis added) Mr Myers also admitted that defendant did not make 
any misleading statements of material facts that could be made not misleading by the alleged 
omissions 
Q: [SCHWENKE] Now again, see if you can remember - - think back 
What statement - - misleading statement did I [defendant] make to you that would be 
made not misleading by the information that was not told you9 
A [MYERS] It was just the absence of disclosures 
See TT P 266 (Emphasis added) Even the State's expert witness admitted that the witnesses 
did not give any misleading statements of material facts made by defendant On cross 
examination, the State's expert, Mr Hines, confirmed the lack of misleading statements 
Q: [HARMON] In the testimony that you heard, was there ever any testimony that 
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you would treat as a misleading statement that Mr. Schwenke made in connection with 
the sale of this stock? 
A: [HINES] Yes 
Q: [HARMON] Could you tell what misleading statement he made? 
A: [HINES] I remember the - - well, if my memory is correct, 
Mr. Schwenke - - okay, now let me correct that. The testimony was that Mr. 
Johnson was introduced as an attorney. 
Q: [HARMON] Yes 
A: [HINES] And that fact actually was true at the time. He was under 
disciplinary action. Now I remember. Now I remember the testimony that Mr. 
Schwenke said that he had been an attorney and that he no longer was practicing law and 
was doing this for a business, so let me correct myself on that. I don't remember that 
misstatement. 
Q: [HARMON] Okay. So did you hear, then, any misstatement made by Schwenke 
to either Mr. Myers or Mr. Young? 
A: [HINES] I don't remember any misscat^mu^ *hat Mr. Schwenke 
made. 
See TT pp. 289 -290. (Emphasis added). 
Under the plain meaning of the statute, the State has two ways to prove its case. The 
State can prove its case under the first prong of the statute by establishing untrue statements of 
material facts made by the defendant or under the second prong, the State can prove its case by 
proving two statements: one made, and one omitted. Under the second prong, the State must 
prove the first statement which is a statement of material fact actually made by the defendant, 
then the State much prove the second statement which is a statements of material fact the 
defendant omitted to make. With at least 20 alleged omissions, it is clear that the State elected to 
use the second prong, based on alleged omissions of material facts, to establish its case of 
security fraud.5 Accordingly, the State must prove a statement made and the statement omitted. 
What is the statement made by the defendant? To answer that question we need to look 
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at the purpose the statute provides for the State to prove the second or omitted statement. The 
statute is clear that the omitted statement would make the first statement not misleading. It 
follows, therefore, that the first statement must be a misleading statement that the second and 
omitted statement would make not misleading. Therefore, to prove its case, the State must first 
establish a misleading statement actually made by the defendant. Only after establishing that 
misleading statement can the State then prove the second statement which is the one that the 
defendant failed to make, but should have made to make the first and misleading statement, not 
misleading. 
The State clearly failed to establish the first statement as admitted to by its witnesses 
including its expert. Both Mr. Young and Mr. Myers admitted that defendant did not make any 
misleading statements. The State's expert Mr. Hines admitted that there were no misleading 
statements made by the defendant Mr. Hines clearly acknowledged that neither Mr. Young nor 
Mr. Myers stated any misleading statements made by the defendant. 
Q: [HARMON] Could you tell what misleading statement he made? 
A: [HINES] I remember the - - well, if my memory is correct, 
Mr. Schwenke - - okay, now let me correct that. The testimony was that Mr. 
Johnson was introduced as an attorney. 
Q: [HARMON] Yes 
A: [HINES] And that fact actually was true at the time. He was under 
disciplinary action. Now I remember. Now I remember the testimony that Mr. 
Schwenke said that he had been an attorney and that he no longer was practicing law and 
was doing this for a business, so let me correct myself on that. I don't remember that 
misstatement. 
Q: [HARMON] Okay. So did you hear, then, any misstatement made by Schwenke 
to either Mr. Myers or Mr. Young? 
A: [HINES] I don't remember any misstatements that Mr. Schwenke 
5
 The Court also acknowledged that the State did not prove any untrue statements: "I think that they haven't 
pointed out any untrue statement, . . ." TT p. 298. 
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made. 
See TT p. 290. (Emphasis added). Because no misleading statement of material facts made by 
defendant has been identified and established, all alleged omissions are left hanging without any 
statements actually made by the defendant to attach to. That is a gaping hole in the State's case. 
Without misleading statements of material facts that could be made not misleading by omissions 
alleged by the State, there could not be a violation of the statute by the defendant as charged. 
B. The State failed to establish an offer, sale, or purchase of a security 
by the defendant and for value. 
As quoted above, Section 61-1-1 requires that the State must prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant engaged in an offer, sale or purchase of a security for value. 
Accordingly, there can be no crime of security fraud unless the defendant offered, sold or 
purchased any security. What is a security? The State charged that the stock of American 
Dairy.com possessed by Mr. Young and Mr. Myers and as reflected in the August 9, 2000 
agreement was security as contemplated in the statute. 
Q: [GUNNIARSON] What is - - what makes a stock a security? 
A: [HINES] . . For a transaction to be a security that's called 
stock, it requires normal characteristics of stock. Those normally are the right to vote, the 
ability to hypothecate or lend against the stock that you now possess, your right to 
participate in dividends if they're ever offered, and the ability of that stock to be able to 
appreciate in value. 
Q: [GUNNARSON] So in your opinion, if I were to show you a document and 
have someone testify, "I took this stock certificate anticipating profit and I had the right 
to vote," would those be indications of a stock, a true security? 
A: [HINES] Yes. The general presumption in the industry is that the 
stock certificate normally is a security, almost always, it's a very rare circumstance in 
which stock is held not to be a security. But your question was if you have the stock 
certificate and you have some of the normal characteristics of stock, then yes, that 
transaction is a security. 
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See TT pp. 84-85. (Emphasis added). 
Notwithstanding, the State's claim that the American Dairy.com stock certificates held by 
Mr. Young and Mr. Myers were securities, they were not, as a matter of law. The United States 
Supreme Court held that the economic reality6 test is the linchpin of securities analysis. United 
House Foundation v. Foreman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 
(1967). This view was also followed recently by a federal court cautioning that "in searching for 
the meaning and scope of the word 'security' . . . the emphasis should be on economic reality." 
Stechler v. Sidley, Austin, Zicw & Wood LLP, 382 F. Supp. 2d 580 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
Accordingly, Mr. Young and Mr. Myer's receipt of American Dairy.com stock under the August 
9, 2000 agreement must be reviewed for its economic reality to determine if the transaction 
constituted a sale of security. 
The economic reality behind Mr. Young and Mr. Myer's ownership of American 
Dairy.com stock under the August 9, 2000 agreement is a mere change of form of the dairy 
operation from the limited liability company to a corporation. While Mr. Young and Mr. Myers 
were the only shareholders of the corporation, the corporation was recruiting other dairy farms to 
participate in the plan. When enough dairy farms participate and become shareholders of 
American Dairy.com, it could register a public offering and raise money for the farmers. The 
dairy farmers were not selling their dairy farms, rather they were merely changing the form of 
ownership of their dairy farms, from whatever it was before, to the corporate form. Mr. Young 
6
 Please note that the State wrongfully argued to the jury that the "economic reality" test does not apply in this 
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confirmed that the transaction in this case was merely a change of form. 
Q: [GUNNARSON] Was it your desire to merely change the form of ownership 
of your dairy farm, put it from an LLC to a corporation? 
A: [YOUNG] Yeah, I guess so. That's what we were trying to do. 
See TT p. 145. (Emphasis added). Moreover, Mr. Young and Mr. Meyer confirmed that the 
plan was for several dairy farms to participate in the corporation, and when enough signed up, 
the corporation could become a viable company to take to the stock market. 
Q: [GUNNARSON] What did Mr. Schwenke tell you his concept of American 
Dairy.com was? 
A: [YOUNG] He said he ultimately wanted to get to 10 or 15,000 cows, 
several dairies, and basically form a publically Laded ^rrpany. 
SeeTTpp. 121-122. (Emphasis added). 
Q: [SCHWENKE] . . . Now you testified today that the plan that was 
explained at the meeting in Fillmore was for several of these struggling farmers like your 
farm, would get together and join in the corporation; is that correct? 
A: [YOUNG] Well, they didn't have to be struggling, but Yes. 
Q: [SCHWENKE] Okay. The idea was not one farm but several farms to - -
A: [YOUNG] Yes 
See TT p. 174 (Emphasis added). 
Q: [SCHWENKE] Now - - so the plan was not one farm like your farm 
but several farmers to come together under the corporation? 
A: [YOUNG] Yes. 
Q: [SCHWENKE] If there are enough farmers that are able to come in and 
join this corporation, then this corporation could become a viable company to 
take to the stock market; wasn't that the plan? 
A: [YOUNG] Yes. 
Q: [SCHWENKE] So this idea of the IPO was something that would happen 
- - would take place under this plan only after there's enough farmers join the 
corporation; is that correct? 
case: "You do not apply the economy reality. . . . if you have stock that meets the normal characteristics of stock 
that we talked about, then the transaction is a security. See TT p.364. 
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A: [YOUNG] I'm sure - - that was one of the requirements, one of the 
things that we needed to do before the IPO. 
See TT pp. 175-176 (Emphasis added). 
Q: [SCHWENKE] So you agree, then, there was intention or at least part of 
the plan is to have more than one dairy? 
A: [MYERS] Oh definitely. I mean there was no way the stock would 
ever be worth anything with just our dairy alone. 
Q: [SCHWENKE] You testified here earlier that it was only intended for your 
dairy to go public. 
A: [MYERS] No, no, no. If that was the impression, that's false 
Q: [SCHWENKE] In fact--
A: [MYERS] It would - - to do a public offering, it would have been 
that the stock was going to go. It wasn't that my dairy was going to a public off 
- - the American Dairy.com stock. When value that that American Dairy had 
would have been what would have gone public, in my opinion. I don't 
understand stock. 
Q: [SCHWENKE] You do believe then that was something that was an 
objective to accomplish in the future that somehow we would hope that by 
sometime in the future we would have enough cows, enough farms joining the 
corporation here, then we'll look into going into a public offering; is that 
correct? 
A: [MYERS] Yes 
Q: [SCHWENKE] So this idea of the IPO was something that would happen 
- - would take place under this plan only after there's enough farmers join the 
corporation; is that correct? 
A: [MYERS] That would be cor - - that would be correct. 
See TT pp. 257-258. (Emphasis added). 
As the plan got organized, the corporation would hold record title, the farmers, consistent 
with the plan, would continue to control and run their own dairy farms, keeping the cash flow, 
like they have always had as confirmed by Mr. Young; 
Q: [SCHWENKE] You continued to operate and control your farm and do 
everything you had being doing with the farm for - - let me rephrase that. At 
the meeting it was explained that the farmers would continue to own, control - -
to control and run, operate their own farms; is that correct? 
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A: [YOUNG] Yes 
See TT p. 182 (Emphasis added). 
As the evidence confirms, the economic reality of the transaction in this case was clearly 
a future plan for dairy farmers to join the corporate entity, American Dairy.com, and only when 
enough farmers participated and place their cows and farm assets into the corporation, would the 
corporation prepare to enter the stock market and raise funds for the farmers. While the 
corporation holds record title, each farmer retains actual control and run his own operations as 
before. There was no change in the properties and dairy operations other that the dairies would 
be cleaned and painted; an Internet server, a website and cameras installed, so the dairies and 
their operations could be viewed live over the Internet. See TT pp. 189-190. 
There simply was no offer, sale or purchase of American Dairy.com stock. The stock 
certificates held by Mr. and Mr. Myers under the August 9, 2000 agreement reflected that they 
were the only shareholders and the plan was not yet a reality. If more farmers had participated 
than the stock certificates would account for each farmer's interest in the corporation. As 
confirmed by Mr. Young, and consistent with the future plan, he retained control and ran the 
operations of his farm like he had always done prior to entering the August 9, 2000 agreement. 
If the com stock market had not crashed, and if a good number of farmers signed up with the 
corporation, and American Dairy.com became a viable company to take to the stock market, the 
farmers who own the corporation could install officers with immaculate reputations, retain a 
reputable underwriter and expert market makers and take their corporation, American Dairy.com, 
to the stock market to raise themselves money. But that plan was well in the future. That was 
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the economic reality and the reason this venture was undertaken by the defendant. 
Finally, the statute requires that the offer or sale must be for value. Mr. Young confirmed 
that the transaction in this case was not a sale of stock for value, but instead, it was a change in 
the form of ownership from a limited liability company, Milk King Dairy, LLC, to a corporation, 
American Dairy.com. 
Q: [GUNNARSON] Was it your desire to merely change the form of ownership 
of your dairy farm, put it from an LLC to a corporation? 
A: [YOUNG] Yeah, 1 guess so. That's what we were trying to do. 
See TT p. 145. (Emphasis added). There was no offer or sale of stock for value, but merely a 
change of form from a limited liability company to a corporation. Yet, defendant has been 
convicted and imprisoned for doing so. This court is respectfully urged to correct this injustice 
and reverse defendant's wrongful conviction and order his freedom. 
Point Two 
The State's expert witness gave impermissible legal opinion 
Rule 704, Utah Rules of Evidence provides, 
(a) Except as provided in subparagraph (b), testimony in the form of an 
opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it 
embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact, (b) No expert witness 
testifying with respect to the mental or condition of a defendant in a criminal case may 
state an opinion or inference as to whether the defendant did or did not have the mental 
or condition constituting an element of the crime charged or of a defense thereto. Such 
ultimate issues are matters for the trier of fact alone. 
This rule clearly guards against expert witnesses telling the jury what the law is, thus duplicating 
the judge's statement of the law. Steffenson v. Smith's Mgmt Corp., 862 P.2d 1342, 1347 (Utah 
1993), Specht v. Jensen, 853 F. 2d 805, 807 (10th Cir. 1988) (En banc) ["It would be a waste of 
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time if witnesses or counsel should duplicate the judge's statement of the law, and it would 
intolerably confound the jury to have it stated differently." (Emphasis added)]. Moreover, the 
rule guards against the expert witness testifying and utell[ing] the jury what result to reach 'or' 
give legal conclusions." Davidson v. Prince, 813 P.2d 1225, 1230, 1231 (Ut. Ct. App 1991) 
(Emphasis added). 
The State's expert witness, Mr. Hines, clearly give impermissible legal conclusion base 
on the facts as testified to by Mr. Young and Mr. Myers. Rules 702 through 704 controls the 
proper use and application of expert testimonies. Rule 704 prohibits opinion testimonies that 
"tell the jury what result to reach 'or' give legal conclusions." Davidson v. Prince, 813 P.2d 
1225, 1230, 1231 (Ut. Ct. App 1991) (Emphasis added), quoting Owen v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 
698 F.2d 236, 240 (5th Cir. 1983). See also State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421, 428 (Utah 1986) ["It 
is the duty of the judge to instruct the jury on relevant law."]. Furthermore, there is "a danger 
that a juror may turn to the [witness's legal conclusion] rather than the judge for guidance on the 
applicable law. Steffensen, supra. @ 1348. While there is no bright line separating permissible 
and impermissible expert opinion testimonies, the Utah Supreme court has provided guidance as 
to what is impermissible. In Specht, supra at 806, the Utah Supreme Court held that it is 
impermissible for the expert to "state his views of the law which governs the verdict and opine 
whether defendant's conduct violated the law." (Emphasis added). Also see State v. Tenney, 
913 P. 2d 750, 756 (Ut. Ct. App. 1996) [Concluding that admission of testimony was erroneous 
because witnesses "tie[d] their opinions to the requirements of Utah law" (Emphasis added)]; 
Davidson, supra at 31-32 [Holding that trial court properly excluded, as impermissible 
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conclusion, testimony that defendant was negligent.]; and State v. Stringham, 957 P.2d 602, 607-
8 (Ut Ct. App. 1998) [Holding that it was reversible error for the trial court to allow testimony by 
Internal Revenue Service agent regarding the lawfulness of defendant's activities. (Emphasis 
added]. 
A recent illustration of this prohibition is found in State v. Davis, 155 P.3d 909 (Ut. Ct. 
App. 2007). In that case, the applicable statute, in part, proscribed possession of a firearm. The 
officer testified and offered an impermissible opinion that defendant had possession because he 
admitted that his fingerprints would be on the gun. 
Q: [PROSECUTOR]: Did [Davis'] own statements such as "my fingerprints 
will be on [the gun], did that come to play? 
A. [SEEGMILLER]: It did. 
Q: [PROSECUTOR]: Why is that? 
A: [SEEGMILLER]: Well, this reference he made was spontaneous that his 
fingerprints would be on it. My understanding of that statute is if his fingerprints 
are on it that obviously means he had handled it. 
Q: [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection, your honor. His testifying what his 
understanding of the statute is is inappropriate. 
R: [THE COURT]: Overruled, Counsel. You brought it up in your cross. 
[The prosecutor] has an opportunity to further explore it. . . . 
A: [SEEGMILLER]: As he said they were on there, if they were, and they - he 
says they were. His claim was, "YouTI find my fingerprints", it's an automatic that he 
had it in his hands. So that to us - our understanding again of that is the possession is to 
hold and to have it in your hands under your control and that's what we went on. 
Davis, supra (Emphasis added). Because of this testimony, the court held that the officer 
applied the fact that the defendant admitted his fingerprint would be on the gun, and improperly 
reached a legal conclusion that the defendant had possession. Please also see State v. Stringham, 
supra, [The IRS agent testified that the defendant assigned income, than the agent concluded that 
the assignment was unlawful tax evasion] Like the Davis and Stringham cases, Mr, Hines for the 
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State, testified what a stock is and gave a legal conclusion that the stock certificates given to Mr. 
Young and Mr. Myers were securities. Mr. Hines testified as to what makes a stock certificate a 
security: 
Q: [GUNNIARSON] What is - - what makes a stock a security? 
A: [HINES] . . For a transaction to be a security that's called stock, 
it requires normal characteristics of stock. Those normally are the right to vote, 
the ability to hypothecate or lend against the stock that you now possess, your 
right to participate in dividends if they're ever offered, and the ability of that 
stock to be able to appreciate in value. 
Q: [GUNNARSON] So in your opinion, if I were to show you a document and 
have someone testify, "I took this stock certificate anticipating profit, and I had I had the 
right to vote," would those be indications of a stock, a true security. 
A: [HINES] Yes. The general presumption in the industry is that the 
stock certificate normally is a security, almost always, it's a very rare circumstance in 
which stock is held not to be a security. But you question was if you have the stock 
certificate and you have some of the normal characteristics of stock, then yes, that 
transaction is a security. 
See TT pp. 84-85. (Emphasis added). Mr. Hines concluded that the stock certificates in this 
case is security: 
Q: [GUNNARSON] 
the right to vote? 
A: 
Q: 
A: 
Q: 
A: 
Q: 
[HINES] 
[GUNNARSON] 
[HINES] 
[GUNNARSON] 
[HINES] 
[GUNNARSON] 
present in this case? 
A: [HINES] 
So you've indicated a token, if you will, of securities is 
Correct 
Was that present in this case? 
It appears it was, yes. 
The right to expect profit; was that present in this case? 
That is — I heard testimony to that effect, yes. 
Indications of ownership in the corporation; was that 
Well, certainly the stock certificate is indicia of owner - -
the fractionalized ownership of the corporation. 
See TT p. 288 (Emphasis added).7 And more particularly, Mr. Hines concluded that Mr. Young 
7
 Defense's counsel timely objected to the impermissible legal opinion of the State's expert witness (See TT p. 
283) preserving this issue for appeal. See Williams v. Bench, 2008 UT 822 (Ut. Ct. App. 2008). 
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and Mr. Myers, the two farmers and the only holders of stock in American Dairy.com received 
stock in a "security transaction": 
Q: [GUNNARSON] Let me give you a hypothetical. Two farmers buy stock in 
the corporation, and they were the - at that time (inaudible) they were the only 
ones that held stock at the time. Would that still be a security transaction? 
A: [HINES] Oh certainly, It doesn't change. If they're the only one or 
there's a million people, you still offered a security. 
See TT p. 102 (Emphasis added) 
The State's expert witness, Mr. Hines, like the witnesses in Davis and Stringham, clearly 
applied the facts of the rase and then rendered an impermissible legal conclusion. Mr. Hines 
testified that the two farmers (Mr. Young and Mr. Myer) bought stock of a corporation 
(American Dairy.com), and the stock gave them the right to vote, expect profit, and ownership of 
the corporation. Based on those facts, Mr. Hines rendered an impermissible legal conclusion that 
the sale of the American Dairy.com stock was a "security transaction". Mr. Hines repeatedly, 
throughout his testimony, told the jury that the stock certificates given to Mr. Young and Mr. 
Myers were securities. Because the economic reality of the transaction in this case does not 
support a finding of a sale of security, as a matter of law, Mr. Hine's impermissible legal 
conclusion must have been the reason the jury convicted defendant. Accordingly, defendant 
respectfully urge the honorable court to please correct the injustice inflicted on him, and 
immediately reverse his wrongful conviction. 
Point Three 
The State violated the constitution by creating its own law, rather 
than applying Utah Code Ann. 61-1-1 as enacted by the legislature. 
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The law as charged, 61-1-1(2), is clear as to the scope of the disclosures that are required. 
"It is unlawful for any person . . . t o : . . . ( 2 ) . . . omit to state a material fact necessary in 
order to make the statement made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not 
misleading." (Emphasis added). The provision is clear that the only disclosures required are 
those material facts that would make any misleading statement of fact actually made by the 
defendant, not misleading. To comply with the plain meaning of the statute requires the State to 
first establish misleading statements of material facts actually made by the defendant, then show 
statements of material facts not made or omitted by the defendant, which the defendant should 
have made so as to render those misleading statements that were made, not misleading. The 
State in this case clearly ignored the first requirement that the State must establish misleading 
statements of material facts actually made by the defendant. Instead, the State only focused on 
the second part of the statute and listed at least twenty statements that the defendant allegedly 
omitted or failed to make. 
The State claimed that the defendant was a promoter and control person of American 
Dairy.com, and as such, defendant had a duty to make numerous disclosures that a reasonable 
prudent investor would want to know. 
Q: [GUNNARSON] If a promoter who is significantly involved in the sales of 
the corporation says, "Do you want to buy stock for I have stock to sell," would 
that be considered a predicate statement? 
A: [HINES] Yes. As soon as he opened the door by offering stock, the 
offer of the stock is a predicate statement that requires the disclosure of all 
material facts relative to that particular stock issue. 
See TT p. 92-93 (Emphasis added) Please also see p. 93. What is a material fact? According to 
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the State, a material fact is a fact any reasonable prudent investor would want to know before 
making his decision to purchase. 
Q: [GUNNARSON] . . . Once again, material fact is something that any 
investor would what? 
A: [HINES] It's a fact any reasonable prudent investor would want to 
know before they make their decision in purchasing. 
See TT. p.90 (Emphasis added). Please also see p.91. According to the State, as soon as 
someone offers to sell stock, he is required to disclose all "material facts". The State's view, 
however, is clearly contrary to the requirements of Section 61-1-1(2). Rather that disclosing all 
facts a reasonable prudent investor would want to know before they make their decision m 
purchasing, section 61-1-1(2) only requires disclosures of material facts that would make any 
misleading statements actually made by the defendant, not misleading. 
But based on the State's erroneous view of the law, the State through Mr. Hines, told the 
jury that defendant was a promoter and control person with a duty to made numerous disclosures. 
Q: [GUNNARSON] Based upon what you're heard today, how would 
you define Mr. Schwenke's role? 
A: [HINES] Well, it's my opinion that Mr. Schwenke acted as 
president or corporate officer during a period of time, and was the major 
promoter of the sale of the stock making him a control person. . . Then 
since he had some ability to control the success or failure of the business 
venture, then all material facts that relate to his ability or inability to be 
successful in that transaction would need to be disclosed. 
See TT p. 286. (Emphasis added). According to the State's erroneous view of the law, the 
defendant, as a control person, failed to made numerous disclosures that are clearly not within 
the purview and requirements of Section 61-1-1(2) of the code. Mr. Hines told the jury that the 
defendant should have made approximately twenty disclosures in connection with the transaction 
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in this case. The following are a few of the examples of the disclosures that Mr. Hines told the 
jury that the defendant should have made; (See Fact #28 above for a lists of at least 20 
disclosures that the State claimed the defendant had a duty to make under the statute.) 
(1). The defendant's civil background, 
Q: [GUNNARSON] How about civil backgrounds of control persons? Should 
they be disclosed? 
A: [HINES] Any fact dealing with the history of any civil litigation, 
criminal litigation, regulatory administrative actions of control persons has to be 
disclosed in connection with that offer or sale. 
See TT p. 96 (Emphasis added). 
(2). The defendant's tax liens, 
Q: [GUNNARSON] How about tax liens, would they be necessary to disclose 
by a control person? 
A: [HINES] It is my opinion that a tax lien would certainly be a 
material fact that should be disclosed. It demonstrates the ability of the control 
person to be subjected to potential civil litigation or the seizure of assets, and 
also demonstrates their history of not properly paying taxes. 
See TT p. 96 -97 (Emphasis added). Please also see p. 101. 
(3) The defendant's disbarment, 
[GUNNARSON] Would the fact that a control person had been disbarred, in your 
opinion, how would that relate to your term poison of the offering? 
[HINES] The first issue I'd want to look at is the reason why the person 
was disbarred. If it had anything to do with honesty or trust, then it certainly would be a 
fact, in my opinion that should be disclosed. 
TT p. 101. (Emphasis added). 
Contrary to the State's view, and under the plain meaning of the statute, the disclosures 
are limited to material facts necessary to make a misleading statement of material fact actually 
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made by the defendant, not misleading. The statute requires the State to first prove a true but 
misleading statement of material fact actually made by defendant, then and only then, can the 
State show statements of material facts that the defendant omitted to make, but should have made 
as to render the statement actually made, not misleading. Rather than staying within the scope of 
the statute, the State created its own law and expanded the required disclosures to all that a 
"reasonable prudent investor would want to know before they make their decision in 
purchasing." The State's erroneous view of the law was successfully argued to the court, 
notwithstanding, the court noted that the statute does not define the terms "promoter" and 
"control person"; 
[GUNNARSON] Your honor, the State's position is the same. Mr. Schwenke in 
his motion argued credibility. That's a question for the jury. He argued that there were 
no predicate statements. I think we've had abundant testimony as to predicate 
statements and the fact of obligations of disclosures, the fact that he was a promoter and 
the fact (inaudible) even a promoter that put upon him the duty of all disclosure, which 
he breached. The fact that he didn't — he brought up subjects such as risk — 
[THE COURT] Well promoter is not a defined term in the statute. 
[GUNNARSON] No, but (inaudible) definition that he's a control person, and a 
control person has that — according to Mr. Hines — 
[THE COURT] Well there's no — control person is not a defined in the statute 
either. 
[GUNNARSON] Well true, but then the expert testimony has been that 
(inaudible) is he is a control person and a promoter, and they have the duty to disclose. 
Beyond that, Mr. Hines has testified, and it's obvious for the jury that there is an 
opening of the door when he talked about risk. Once you talk about risk you better tell 
all the risks, and that includes conflicts, that includes background. That includes the 
risk of the IPO. As a matter of fact, the IPO was, in Mr. Hines' opinion, very probably 
would not have been granted, and that's something they should have been told. So by 
opening the door and talking about the IPO, he has to tell them the risks involved. 
TT pp. 295-297. The State did not stop with the judge, it also argued the same erroneous view 
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of the law to the jury: 
[GUNNARSON] You're entitled to know whatever a reasonable person would 
consider important. What would be considered important in this case? Risk, once again. 
The IPO we talked about. The debt structure. The organization itself, which was just a 
paper organization. It had no assets. A lie about the assets. 
The background of the individuals. 
Johnson, the CEO, tax lien $201,000. 
Mr. Johnson, notice of federal tax lien, 160 — or $1,645,000. A million-and-a-half 
dollars. 
You're a disbarred attorney. 
How about the fact that you have a tax lien against you, Mr. Schwenke? I had it right 
here in my hand If I recall — and he said approximately a half a million dollars. 
See TT pp. 406-408. 
Instead of prosecuting defendant under 61-1-1(2), the State created its own law calling 
the defendant a promoter and control person, that offered stock, but failed to disclose all facts a 
"reasonable prudent investor would want to know before they make their decision in 
purchasing." The State changed 61-1-1 from a requirement of disclosures limited to those that 
would make any misleading statements made by defendant, not misleading, to disclosures of any 
information a reasonable prudent investor would want to know. Obviously, the State can't make 
up its own laws to put people in prison. But that is exactly what the State did here, and doing so, 
the State has clearly violated defendant's constitutional right to due process, and by infringing on 
the powers of the legislature as discussed next. 
A. Constitutional due process violation 
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Article 1, Sect 7 of the Utah Constitution provides, "No person shall be deprived of life, 
liberty or property, without due process of law". Due process requires that "the defendant 
receive[s] full notice of the charges, the elements, how the defendant's conduct amounts to a 
crime . . ." Salazar v. Utah State Prison, 852 P.2d 988, 991 (Utah 1993). Here, the defendant 
received notice that he was charged with making misleading statements of material facts, and he 
failed or omitted to state material facts necessary to make the misleading statements made, not 
misleading. The defendant, however, did not receive any notice of the misleading statements of 
material facts that he allegedly made. Moreover, the State failed to establish any evidence of 
misleading statements of material facts allegedly made by the defendant. Instead, the State 
provided at least 20 facts that defendant allegedly omitted to disclose. Accordingly, the 
defendant was denied full notice of the charge and the element of misleading statements of 
material facts that he allegedly made. Furthermore, besides failing to provide notice of the 
misleading statements, the State changed the law from one that required the defendant to make 
limited disclosures of material facts, to one that required the defendant to make unlimited 
disclosures that a reasonable prudent investor would want to know. By changing the law, the 
defendant was denied full notice of the charge, the elements of the charge and how defendant's 
conduct amounts to the crime of security fraud. Id 
The Constitutional due process issue in this case can also be reviewed from the 
perspective that the statute (Section 61-1-1(2)) is void for vagueness, as applied to the defendant. 
In West Valley City v. Street, 849 P.2d 613, 615 (Ut. Ct. App. 1993), the Utah Supreme Court 
construed Article I, Section 7 that "[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, 
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without due process of law", and provided that "[i]t is a basic principle of due process that an 
enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined.". Id. (citing Grayned 
v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09(1972); Also see U.S. v. Farris, 614 F.2d 634, 642 
(9* Cir. 1979) ("The rule against vague criminal statutes guard against ctrap[ping] the innocent' 
and delegation of criminological policy decisions to non legislative bodies."). The statute 
provides, in part, that the State must first prove misleading statements of material facts actually 
made by the defendant, then the State can prove statements of material facts that would make the 
misleading statements, not misleading. 
It is unlawful for any person, in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of 
any security, directly or indirectly to: . . . . . . . . . 
(2). . . . . . or omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make 
the statement made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, 
not misleading. Utah Code Ann. 61-1-1 (2) (Emphasis added). 
Apparently, this provision is vague because the State completely misinterpret it. Instead of a law 
with limited scope of disclosures, the State informed the jury that this provision meant that the 
defendant should be convicted for failure to disclose all facts a "reasonable prudent investor 
would want to know before they make their decision in purchasing." TT p.90. The Supreme 
Court in West Valley City, supra, admonished that vague laws would "trap the innocent by not 
providing fair warning", and allows the State "arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement" of the 
law. That is exactly what has happened in this case. The defendant is innocent, yet he has been 
convicted of a felony crime because the State has arbitrarily created a law different from the 
statute the defendant was charged under. 
B. Constitutional Separation of Powers violation 
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The Utah Constitution, Article V, Section 1, provides that u[t]he powers of the 
government of the State of Utah shall be divided into three distinct departments, the Legislature, 
the Executive and the Judicial; and no person charged with the exercise of powers properly 
belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise any function appertaining to either of the 
others. . .". The legislature, comprising of the House of Representative and the Senate, has the 
legislative power. Utah Constitution Article VI, Section 1. Under it's legislative power, the 
legislature enacted Utah Code Ann. Section 61-1-1(2) that the defendant was charged with 
violating. As enacted by the legislature, Section 61-1-1(2) provided for very limited disclosures 
of material facts. The State representing the Executive branch infringed upon the Legislature's 
powers, and accordingly, violated the separation of powers clause of the Constitution by creating 
its own law expanding the disclosure requirements of Section 61-1-1(2) to all information a 
"reasonable prudent investor would want to know before they make their decision in 
purchasing". Obviously, the State cannot do so, and doing so in this case has clearly resulted in 
the jury wrongfully convicting the defendant for security fraud. Accordingly, the defendant 
respectfully urged the honorable court to correct the injustice inflicted upon him, and 
immediately reverse his wrongful conviction. 
Point Four 
Defendant was wrongfully convicted by the court allowing irrelevant 
prejudicial, and inflammatory evidence. 
The charge of security fraud against defendant was based on an alleged sale of American 
Dairy.com stock that closed or completed on August 9, 2000. The statute, Utah Code Ann. 
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Section 61-1-1, requires a finding of misleading statements made by defendant in connection 
with this alleged August 9, 2000 sale. Additionally, once the misleading statement is 
established, the State must then prove statements of material facts that were not made, but should 
have been made by the defendant in order to make the misleading statements that were made, not 
misleading. Both the misleading and omitted statements must be in connection with the alleged 
August 9, 2000 sale agreement. 
The three most inflammatory and prejudicial events presented to the jury as evidence in 
this case had no bearing or any connection whatsoever to the alleged August 9, 2000 stock sale 
agreement. The first is a trust deed for $50,000.00 dated October 16, 2000, over two months 
after the allegedagreement. This evidence as shown next in Section A_is false and irrelevant and 
very prejudicial. The second is an alleged promise by defendant to pay for 200 cows delivered to 
the dairy farm within 30 days after the August 9, 2000 alleged sale agreement. This evidence, as 
shown in Section B, is also false, irrelevant and very prejudicial. Additionally, the State's expert 
witness gave impermissible and highly inflammatory testimony concerning an IPO that was 
irrelevant and very prejudicial. That improper IPO testimony is addressed in Section C. 
A. The evidence of the $50,000 trust deed is false, irrelevant, and very 
prejudicial. 
The State produced a Notice of Default (Exhibit #10) and Trust deed (Exhibit #9) and 
through testimonies of Mr. Young and Mr. Myers made an outrageous claim that defendant took 
$50,000.00 from the dairy farm. 
Q: [GUNNARSON] What is that [Exhibit # 10] 
A: [YOUNG] It's a notice of default from PDN Investments. 
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Q: [GUNNARSON] What did you think when you got a second notice of 
default? 
A: [YOUNG] I thought it was a mistake. 
Q: [GUNNARSON] So you got the notice of default that says its in the 
amount of $50,000.00, is that right? 
A: [YOUNG] Yes 
Q: [GUNNARSON] Can you recall who got the $50,000.00? 
A: [YOUNG] Paul [defendant] did 
See TT p. 163 (Emphasis added) 
Q: [GUNNARSON] Did he spend any of it on the farm? 
A: [YOUNG] No. 
See TT p. 164 (Emphasis added). 
Q: [GUNNARSON] Did you ever authorized Mr. Schwenke through this proxy, 
verbally, orally that he could take $50,000 out of the deed to your farm for his 
corporation? 
A: [MYERS] No, he never — that never — I never dreamed that would 
have happened. I didn't think it could happen because I knew that Central Bank had the 
first mortgage on that loan. I didn't know he could re- mortgage that again. 
Q: [GUNNARSON] So he never told you he was going to take $5,000.00 
personally out of it; is that correct? 
Q: [MYERS] Oh $5,000 personally? 
G: [GUNNARSON] Or $50,000.00 
A: [MYERS] No, No. 
See TT pp. 277-278 (Emphasis added) Contrary to the testimonies, there was no evidence of a 
note for $50,000.00, no evidence that the missing note was funded, and no evidence that 
defendant took $50,000.00. 
Q: [SCHWENKE] Okay. As a matter of fact, you don't have a note that in 
fact was signed for this alleged loan, and top of that, you don't know if any - -
even if there was a note, whether there was any money paid on this note, is that 
correct? 
A: [YOUNG] That's true, I don't 
SeeTTp. 187. (Emphasis added). In deed, but for ineffective assistance of counsel, bank 
records and testimony from PDN Investments would have established that only $12,500.00 was 
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funded on the loan. And notwithstanding, Mr. Young's denial of the loan, he personally 
received $7,000.00, and the balance of $5,500.00 was paid on a $15,000 bill from cSave.net, 
LLC that cleaned, painted the dairy, and installed the internet server, website and cameras 
throughout the dairy8 as confirmed by Mr. Young at trial. No funds went to Mr. Schwenke 
whatsoever. 
Q: [SCHWENKE] When you joined American Dairy.com under the 
agreement, your farm, according to the plan, was also then equipped with these 
internet equipment, is that correct? 
A: [YOUNG] Yes 
Q: [SCHWENKE] As a matter of fact, some people came over and 
clean the place up and painted, help you with the - - putting a special room. 
They installed internet server, computer and stuff. All of that happened is that 
correct? 
A: [YOUNG] Yes 
See TT pp. 189-190 (Emphasis added). 
The evidence of the loan, and the charge that defendant took $50,000 personally from the 
proceeds of the loan is absolutely false.9 Moreover, the loan was made over two months after the 
August 9, 2000 alleged sale agreement; and accordingly, it had no bearing or any connection to 
alleged stock sale. The loan is therefore, not relevant to the allege security fraud and should not 
have been presented to the jury. The loan is not a statement of material fact made by the 
defendant in connection with the August 9, 2000 agreement. The loan is not an omission of a 
Appellant was denied a remand to establish evidence of the loan including copies of the checks issued to James 
Young and cSave.net, LLC and the copies of the checks with the court order included herein as Appendix II. 
Ineffective assistance of counsel: The defendant was incarcerated in August, 2005 and remained incarcerated at the time of 
the trial in this case in June, 2007, and remained so until November 4, 2008. Accordingly, defendant was not available and free 
to prepare for the trial. As a result, defendant had to rely on his counsel to properly prepare for trail. Early in the case, 
defendant advised his attorney to visit with a Mr. Bitton from Idaho and to subpoena him for the trial. Defendant also asked his 
attorney to subpoena all the records of the loan from PDN Investments. At the morning of trial, defendant was told by his 
attorney that Mr. Bitton was not coming to the trial, and the PDN Investments record were not subpoenaed. As a result of 
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material fact that would have made any misleading statement made by the defendant on or before 
August 9, 2000, not misleading. The allegation and the false evidence that defendant took 
$50,000 from the farm is inflammatory and extremely prejudicial that it must have caused the 
jury to wrongfully convict the defendant. Therefore, this court is respectfully urged to please 
correct this miscarriage of justice and restore defendant's freedom by reversing and vacating 
defendant's wrongful conviction. 
B. The evidence that defendant promised to pay for the 200 cows is false, 
irrelevant inflammatory and very prejudicial. 
After the August 9, 2000 agreement, approximately 200 cows were delivered to the dairy. 
The State through Mr. Young claims that defendant told Young to buy the cows, and defendant 
failed to pay for them. 
Q: [SCHWENKE] Okay. You testified today that defendant told you to 
go and buy 200 cows to put in the dairy; is that correct? 
A: [YOUNG] Yes, 
Q: [SCHWENKE] Then the defendant didn't pay for the cows, and they 
got repossessed, is that correct? 
A: [YOUNG] Yes 
See TT p. 192 (Emphasis added). While Mr. Young claims that defendant was supposed to pay 
for the cows, he acknowledge that defendant did not promise, or had any obligation under the 
August 9, 2000 agreement to buy cows. 
Q: [SCHWENKE] . . . It [the August 9, 2000 agreement] doesn't say 
anything about defendant having or promising or having any obligation to go buy cows 
for this farm; is that correct? 
A: [YOUNG] That's correct. 
See TT p. 192 (Emphasis added). According to the State, within 30 days after the August 9, 2000 
counsel's failure to obtain the PDN Investment records, defenda42 was unable to establish the evidence of the loan at trial. 
agreement, the cows were delivered to the farm, and during the next 30 days the cows were 
repossessed. See TT pp. 243-244. When the cows were repossessed, the dairy was over. 
Q: [GUNNARSON] Were they ["cows] ever repossessed? 
A: [MYERS] Yes 
Q: [GUNNARSON] What happened to the finances of the farm after the cows 
were taken back? 
A: [MYERS] It was over. I mean we were struggling before this 
transaction. We had put, I don't know, three months of feed into these cows, we 
had calved them all out, just barely starting to get some milk flow out of them to 
where they would have probably broke even and they were gone, and we were 
done. I mean it was over. 
See TT pp. 244-245 (Emphasis added). 
The State put the blame on the defendant for the loss of the dairy farm. In deed, it must 
have inflamed the jury enough to find defendant guilty of a crime he did not commit. Moreover, 
the claim is clearly irrelevant. Defendant's allege promise to pay for the cows, even if it was 
made, was not made until after the August 9, 2000 allegedstock sale agreement. Therefore, it 
could not have been a misleading statement of a material fact made by defendant in connection 
with the August 9, 2000 sale agreement. Furthermore, assuming arguendo, that defendant made 
misleading statements, the promise to pay for the cows could not be a statement of material fact 
that defendant omitted to make on or before August 9, 2000 that could make any misleading 
statement, not misleading. The prejudicial impact of this evidence, however, is plain and clear 
and must have caused the jury to convict defendant. Accordingly, this court is again respectfully 
urged, for this additional ground, to reverse and vacate the defendant's wrongful conviction. 
C The State's expert witness gave impermissible testimony concerning an IPO 
that was irrelevant, inflammatory and very prejudicial. 
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This case does not involve an Initial Public Offering ("IPO") of stock. Indeed, even the 
court acknowledged that the case does not involve an IPO: 
[HARMON] You honor, again I'd like to pose an objection because I think that 
we're going far a field to the facts of this case. 
[GUNNARSON] You honor, if I may respond. 
[THE COURT] Go ahead. 
[GUNNARSON] Your honor, if nothing else, this is foundational. I have 
documents here that I'm going to have to admit sooner or later. This foundational. It 
goes right to the heart of the case. 
[THE COURT] Well, this case does not involve an IPO does it Mr. Gunnarson? 
TT p. 100 (Emphasis added.). Yet, prior to Mr. Harmon's objection, the State has presented 
outrageously inflammatory testimony concerning an IPO and implying that the defendant in tnis 
case failed to make the disclosures required to sell stock, and that the sale of stock in this case 
was poisoned by defendant's disbarment: 
Q: [GUNNARSON] Are you familiar with the term initial public offering? 
A: [HINES] Yes. 
Q: [GUNNARSON] What is - is it call and IPO? 
A: [HINES] Yes, that's an IPO. 
Q: [GUNNARSON] IPO. 
A: [HINES] Right. 
Q: [GUNNARSON] Don't want to be too confusing (inaudible) I could never 
speak military because they have too may acronyms, so I'll continue to call it an 
initial public offering, okay? What is necessary for someone to obtain — well, 
first of all, what is an initial public offering? How does it come about? 
A: [HINES] That is the initial introduction of the stock from the issuer 
to the general public. 
Q: [GUNNARSON] What is necessary in order for the issuer to introduce 
stock to the general public? 
A: [HINES] The issuer is going to have to either do a registration or 
find some circumstances under which they are exempt from registration. The 
majority of the ones we're seeing now fall under what's call 506 (inaudible) 
offerings. After they handle their registration issues, if we assume it's an 
offering with a company that has $25 million or less in income, they could 
qualify for SB-10 regulations, and they then will need to find an underwriter to 
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sell those stocks. 
The duty of the underwriter is - normally is to take the entire quantity of 
stock and to sell it in the secondary market, but an underwriter can also elect to 
take part of that stock and sell it and not take the risk of possessing all the stock. 
Q: [GUNNARSON] What I hear you saying - tell me if I'm wrong — is that an 
underwriter sells so that he sponsors the stock? 
A: [HINES] That's correct. 
Q: [GUNNARSON] What is — in your experience, what is necessary for an 
underwriter to know in order to determine whether or not that person will 
sponsor the stock and present it to the public? 
A: [HINE] Well, what an underwriter is going to do is tremendous 
amount of basically boilerplate due diligence concerning the requirements for 
disclosure, including risk, capitalization, distribution, commissions to be paid, 
background of the principals and control persons involved in the issuing 
company. 
Q: [GUNNARSON] Are there times in which an underwriter refuses to 
sponsor stock? 
A: [HINES] Oh, absolutely, yes. 
Q: [GUNNARSON] What would the reasons, in your experience, be that 
would happen? 
A: [HINES] Well, certainly if there's — an underwriter may put a lot of 
weight on the fact that there's so much competition in the market doing the very 
same thing that it is unlikely he can sell the stock. Well, certainly one of the 
areas that underwriters look at that the industry recognizes poisoning the issue is 
if there is significant discipline history or other history of principals involved 
and control persons involved in the issuing of the stock, then underwriters 
know that those facts have to be disclosed to potential investors, and so they'll 
have a tendency to back down from those offerings. 
Q: [GUNNARSON] Would those - now you use the term "poison." What do 
you mean by -
A: [HINES] That's an industry term that we use in our NASA 
meetings. 
Q: [GUNNARSON] Which means what? 
A: [HINES] Basically it's probably going to bar an underwriter from 
taking that to a secondary market and selling that stock. They're not going to 
sell it and they're going to turn down this underwriting because of that fact. 
Q: [GUNNARSON] Is there a registration document that must be filled out? 
A: [HINES] Well, depending on whether you're filing for an 
exemption from registration or are registering the product yourself, the majority 
of the transactions states deal with are exempt transactions, and so they don't 
have to file registration. They may have to file some notice with the State, 
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though. 
Q: [GUNNARSON] Coming back to your idea of poison, there were two 
words, poison something. 
A: [HINES] Poison the offering 
G: [GUNNARSON] Poison - three words, poison the offering. Poisoning the 
offering, you indicated there were certain thing that an underwriter would consider very 
serious. Give me an idea of what those things would be. How about tax liens on the 
control person of the corporation. Would that be considered? 
See TT pp. 97-100. (Emphasis added). And even after Mr. Harmon's objection, the court still 
allowed State to continue with irrelevant IPO testimony, and even stating that defendant's 
disbarment poisoned the offering in this case. 
Q: [GUNNARSON] Would the fact that a control person had been disbarred, 
in your opinion, how would that relate to your term poison of the offering? 
A: [HINES] The first issue I'd want to look at is the reason why the 
person was disbarred. If it had anything to do with honesty or trust, then it 
certainly would be a fact, in my opinion, that should be disclosed. 
Q: [GUNNARSON] Tax liens? 
A: [HINES] Tax liens of the control person, again, I think are very 
important facts for an investor to know and to give them - the investor can give 
that fact the amount of weight that they think it deserves, but it's my opinion that 
it should be disclosed. 
See TT p. 101. The court also allowed the State to continue with irrelevant IPO questions when 
the State questioned Mr. Drage. 
Q: [GUNNARSON] Let's talk about the IPO, the initial public offering. 
A: [DRAGE] Yes sir. 
Q: [GUNNARSON] You indicated that if there is an initial public offering 
there has to be tremendous disclosures, right? 
A: [DRAGE] Yes, at the time of the IPO. 
Q: [GUNNARSON] Okay. That would have included Mr. Schwenke's 
disbarment? 
A: [DRAGE] I don't know, It didn't happen, so « 
Q: [GUNNARSON] No, I'm just talking about - you know how an IPO 
works? 
A: [DRAGE] Perfectly. 
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Q: [GUNNARSON] 
have disclosed Mr. Schwenke 
A: [DRAGE] 
they signed it, yeah. 
Q 
A 
Q 
m 
A 
Q 
A 
[GUNNARSON] 
[DRAGE] 
[GUNNARSON] 
illion dollars? 
[DRAGE] 
[GUNNARSON] 
[DRAGE] 
Okay. In that case, if there had been an IPO, it would 
's disbarment, correct? 
If there had been an IPO on August 12th or 18th, whenever 
Okay. It would have had to disclose his tax liens, correct? 
I'd have to take a look at that. Maybe not the tax liens. 
Mr. Schwenke or Mr. Johnson's tax liens of over a 
Maybe no. 
He signed as the CEO of the corporation. 
You're asking me about if an IPO took place, but there — 
an IPO didn't take place. 
Q: [GUNNARSON] Okay. Hypothetical, there was an IPO issued, okay. 
Would the issuer had been informed about Mr. Schwenke's disbarment? 
A: [DRAGE] 
officers, probably. 
Q: [GUNNARSON] 
A: [DRAGE] 
entanglements. 
Q: [GUNNARSON] 
If the issuer hac1 H°ne an IPO they wouldn't have them as 
Because they would know about that, correct? 
To - well, for ~ to make sure that there weren't any legal 
Exactly, It's important in an IPO to give all the 
backgrounds of the principals, correct? 
A: [DRAGE] 
Q: [GUNNARSON] 
A: [DRAGE] 
Q: [GUNNARSON] 
A: [DRAGE] 
Q: [GUNNARSON] 
against Mr. Johnson — 
A; [DRAGE] 
Q: [GUNNARSON] 
A: [DRAGE] 
Q: [GUNNARSON] 
A: [DRAGE] 
Q: [GUNNARSON] 
A: [DRAGE] 
Q: [GUNNARSON] 
principals? 
A: [DRAGE] 
could be a DUI. It's just not going to be an item. 
At the time of the IPO. 
Yes. 
Yes 
Does it include the disbarment? 
It could, yes. 
Would it have included the disciplinary proceeding 
No. 
— and his bar? 
No. 
Would you have included tax loan — or liens? 
I'd have to analyze that. Possibly not. 
Probably so, in your experience? 
I'd have to re-read it 
Okay. How about civil judgments against one of the 
Only if it involved issue of honesty. In other words, it 
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Q: [GUNNARSON] Civil judgment of a substantial amount? 
A: [DRAGE] Well, I mean he might have violated a ~ I don't know. 
He could have broken - breached a contract. That doesn't necessarily mean that 
that's something that has to be disclosed. 
Q: [GUNNARSON] Financial status has to be disclosed, correct? 
A: [DRAGE] No 
Q: [GUNNARSON] Financial status doesn't - -
A: [DRAGE] Of an individual? No. Only bankruptcy. If there's been a 
bankruptcy filed in the last five years. 
Q: [GUNNARSON] An underwriter wouldn't be interested to know that one of 
the principals has a judgment over their head for so many hundreds of thousands 
of dollars? 
A: [DRAGE] Well (inaudible) an underwriter might want to know, but 
it's not required to be put in there. The statutory requirement is that if there's 
been a bankruptcy in the last five years then you disclose it, otherwise there's not 
a disclosure. 
Q; [GUNNARSON] The purpose of having an underwriter is the underwriter 
looks at the initial public offering and makes sure that all the proper disclosures 
are there, correct? 
A: [DRAGE] No, the purpose of the underwriter is to go get the money. 
Q: [GUNNARSON] Okay, but he's also responsible for making sure that all 
the disclosures are there or he wouldn't underwrite it? 
A: [DRAGE] They are also responsible for the disclosures, correct. 
Q: [GUNNARSON] Right, or they wouldn't underwrite it. 
A: [DRAGE] Correct. 
Q: [GUNNARSON] And those disclosures would be anything that an investor 
would think significant or important in making their decision as to whether to 
invest, correct. 
A: [DRAGE] They would analyze it that way. 
Q: [GUNNARSON] Okay. The background-
[HARMON] I'd like to object at this point to this whole line of 
questioning because we're talking about hypothetical and we're talking about an 
IPO. There's never been any proof in this case that there ever was an IPO. 
[GUNNARSON] Your honor, may - I'm sorry. 
[THE COURT] Go ahead, Mr. Gunnarson. 
[GUNNARSON] If the jury finds that there was more than just a mere 
change of ownership, then they're entitled to go into every misrepresentation and 
every omission from there. That's a question of the jury. Just because it was not 
issued doesn't mean that they can't consider it. 
[THE COURT] Overruled. I find it to be a proper hypothetical. Go 
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ahead. 
TT PP 357-360 (Amphasis added) 
By overruling the objection, the court allowed the jury to consider the repeated 
misstatement of the law by Mr. Gunnarson, ["If the jury finds that there was more than just a 
mere change of ownership, then they're entitled to go into every misrepresentation and every 
omission from there." TT p.360 (Emphasis added).]10 and accept as evidence the State's frequent 
statement that the defendant's disbarment, his tax liens and judgments must be disclosed. 
State's unlawful tactics must not be allowed and this court is respectfully urged correct this 
miscarriage of justice and reverse the conviction. The law is clear that the only disclosures 
required under 61-1-1(2) are those that would make a misleading statement made by the 
defendant, not misleading rather than disclosures of all facts a reasonable prudent investor would 
want to know. 
CONCLUSION 
The State charged defendant with violation of Utah Code Ann. Section 61-1-1(2), but 
prosecuted him with a completely different version of the statute. Section 61-1-1(2) requires 
proof that defendant made misleading statements of material facts, and failed to make statements 
of material facts that would make the misleading statements that he made, not misleading. The 
State failed to establish any misleading statements made by the defendant, instead, the State told 
the jury of as many as 20 disclosures that the defendant omitted to make. Without misleading 
statements made by defendant, the jury was left with 20 or so omissions without any misleading 
10
 Gunnarson 4s argument is frivolous because Mr. Young testified that the transaction was a mere change of form 
of the business from a limited liability company to a corporation. 
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statements to attach to. That is a major hole in the State's case and a reason for the court to 
reverse the defendant's conviction. Additionally, the economic reality of the issuance of 
American Dairy.com stock, confirms that there had been no offer or sale of a security in this case 
as charged by the State. United House Foundation v. Foreman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975). On top of 
it all, there was no offer or sale of security for value as Mr. Young confirmed that the 
transaction was merely a change of form of the business from a limited liability company to a 
corporation. 
Moreover, the State's expert gave impermissible legal conclusion that the American 
Dairy.com stock issued to Mr. Young and Mr. Myers was security. That impermissible legal 
opinion compels reversal of the defendant's conviction. State v. Davis, 155 P.3d 909 (Ut. Ct. 
App. 2007). Couple with an impermissible legal conclusion, the State also presented the jury 
with an erroneous statement of the law claiming that once the defendant offer or sold American 
Diary.com stock that he had a duty to disclose all facts a "reasonable prudent investor would 
want to know before they make their decision in purchasing." The impermissible legal 
conclusion and the erroneous view of the statute are grounds for reversal of the conviction, 
accordingly, the defendant respectfully urged the honorable court to do so, and immediately 
vacate the wrongful conviction and order defendant's freedom. 
Finally, the conviction should be reversed on the additional ground that the court allowed 
irrelevant, inflammatory and prejudicial evidence of an allege $50,000.00 loan, repossession of 
200 cows, and a non existing initial public offering. 
For all the foregoing reasons, appellant respectfully prays the honorable court would 
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reverse his wrongful conviction and order his immediate freedom. 
Dated this day of November, 2008. // , 
A. Paul Schwenke, 
Appellant Pro Se 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage pre-paid, a true and exact copy of the foregoing 
Brief of Appellant to: 
Ms. Kris C. Leonard, Esq. 
Assistant Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Fl. 
P.O. Box 140854 
SLC, UT. 84114-0854 
this of November, 2008. 
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HUB) 
f .; P«fS 
VfftTC 
/\. : iiuJ. Schwenfce, 
Deie^dant and Appellant. 
B*f.-:-)-e Judges Greenwood, Thorne, and Orme. 
Thin matter is before the court on Appellant's motion for 
rerwv id under rule 2 3B of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
A !•••:• ncmd is available only upon "a nonspeculative allegation of 
fact-., rot. fully appearing in the record on appeal, which, if 
true., could support a determination that counsel was 
ineffective," including facts that show "the claimed deficient 
peri ;.rmcmce" and "the claimed prejudice suffered hy the appellant 
as; c result of the claimed deficient performance." Utah R. App. 
p. ::. \B i.&), (b) . 
S'cr.wenke's motion asserts that his trial counsel was 
iue:l. iective because he failed to: (1} object zo the acm.iss.ion of 
a tr ist deed and subpoena bank documents to demonstrate that he 
rece .ved no money from the alleged loan; (2) obtain documents and 
Cell witnesses regarding the value of the dairy; and (3) subpoena 
infc:•-mation as to whether certain individuals may have.received 
vicl'.r.s1 reparation funds or promises of compensation that may 
have biased their testimony. Schwenke does not provide properly 
supported, nonspeculative facts necessary to sustain his 
assertions. Thus, his claims do not warrant remand under rule 
2313. 
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion is denied. 
>i. ed this ii day of September,, 2008. 
FO^. 'T-rC COURT: 
C ::ec 6x y X. Orme, Judge 
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